(c) False-Memory Syndrome
The argument that therapy for real or imagined trauma may lead to “recollections” of events that never happened has been termed the “false-memory syndrome” (Goldstein, 1992).
Originally, the false-memory syndrome was developed to suggest an iatrogenic origin for accounts of childhood sexual abuse and satanic ritual abuse. However, the false-memory syndrome has also been offered (for a list of representative articles see Gotlib, 1993) as an explanation for abduction experiences. (It is not uncommon for abduction experiencers to see mental health professionals for symptoms associated with a believed or suspected abduction experience.) Although the spontaneous emergence during therapy of a completely unsuspected abduction experience is apparently quite rare (based on the general lack of references to such cases in the clinical literature; see, however, Gotlib, 1996), the false-memory syndrome could be a factor in enriching an existing abduction experience, creating whole new experiences beyond those for which the client initially presents, and for hardening conviction in regard to the validity of the experience.
Garry and Loftus (1994) review research using four different sources of suggestion to show that susceptibility to false memory is not an exclusive property of either hypnosis or special imaginative propensities. Rather, it reflects a responsiveness to suggestion that has been amply demonstrated for the general population, and may be occasioned by the particular dynamics that can exist in the therapeutic environment. Their review demonstrates the influence of (a) leading questions, (b) the suggested existence of items or events in a previously observed scene, (c) the transformation of a recollection through new information (inaccurate retrieval cues), and (d) acceptance of a complete memory for something that never happened to the subject.
The authors conclude that these converging experiments “provide compelling evidence that it is not hard at all to make people truly believe they have seen or experienced something they have not-without any hypnosis at all” (pp. 365-66). Indeed, by demonstrating memory creation for significant and traumatic situations, these studies refute the argument that memory alterations can occur only for trivial details and for nontraumatic events.
The concern about therapist influence on the beliefs and memories of clients is sufficiently great that a number of professional organizations in the mental health field (American Psychiatric Association Board of Trustees, 1993; American Psychological Association, 1994; American Society of Clinical Hypnosis, 1995) have formally cautioned their members against practices that might exacerbate the potential for false memories. An ethics committee in ufology (Abduction Study Conference Ethics Committee) has taken a similar position with regard to investigators and mental health professionals working with abduction experiencers (Gotlib, Appelle, Rodeghier, & Flamburis, 1994). The seriousness with which this admonition has been taken by ufologists is reflected in the fact that this Ethics Code has been endorsed by the three major ufological organizations (Center for UFO Studies, Fund for UFO Research, Mutual UFO Network).
In spite of such cautions, there still exist a number of mental health practitioners who continue to use aggressive techniques (e.g., frequent hypnosis sessions, support and discussion groups) to explore for abduction experiences, and to provide (in the absence of independent corroborating evidence) validation of the experience as indicative of an actual alien abduction. These practices are often rationalized in terms of the emotional sincerity of the client, or the apparent improvement in presenting symptoms that occurs during the course of treatment. However, as one therapist (Nash, 1994) noted in reviewing the literature on recovered memory and trauma:
Clinical utility and historical veridicality are so confounded in psychoanalytical and other insight-oriented therapies…. Clinical utility may have little or nothing to do with uncovering the truth about the patient’s past. We should stop claiming that it does…. What patients think they have found out about their past may be helpful, but that does not necessarily mean that it is accurate. [Nash, 1994, p. 35]
PERSONALITY THEORIES
Some theories suggest that special personality syndromes predispose individuals to incorporate information about alien abductions into their imaginative productions, and to accept these productions as experiences of historical events. Unlike the factors just discussed, these syndromes are not characterized by suggestibility per se. Rather, suggestion capitalizes on these personality traits to take the form of the abduction experience.
(a) The Boundary-Deficit Hypothesis
Hartmann (1984) studied individuals who suffer from nightmares. He found that this population shared a constellation of traits characterized by weak discrimination between basic cognitive categories such as self and nonself, fantasy and reality, dream and waking experiences, etc. These weak “boundaries” result in individuals who are sensitive, artistic, empathetic, vulnerable, imaginative, have a weak sense of sexual or personal identity, have difficulty distinguishing periods of time, and are perceived by others as different.
Kottmeyer (1988) has argued that this description of the boundary-deficit personality also describes the abduction experiencer, and that these characteristics provide a breeding ground for experiencing close encounters. According to Kottmeyer:
To be considered a candidate for the hypothesis that one is a victim of alien abduction a person must present certain symptoms. Among the factors which are looked for are conscious memories of an abduction, revealing nightmares, missing time, forgotten scars, or dramatic reactions to seemingly trivial … lights…. The last four factors act as screening devices to yield a population of boundary-deficit individuals. This is blatant in the case of people whose candidacy [as an abduction experiencer] is based on nightmares of aliens. It is subtler in other symptoms. People who have thin boundaries in their time sense … will experience periods of missing time … [and] could easily lose track of the event that led to the creation of a scar. People with weak ego-id boundaries and a sense of powerlessness probably would over-react to distant inexplicable lights …. We would predict the final population of abduction claimants would be biased in favor of a high proportion of boundary-deficit personalities. [Kottmeyer, 1988, p. 5]
Kottmeyer goes on to argue that popular culture, the media, the activity of abduction investigators, and the use of hypnosis all create an “abduction myth [which] has opportunistic features wherein boundary-deficit traits act to justify id material … being considered real” (p. 7). He makes a more specific case for the availability of such material elsewhere (Kottmeyer, 1989).
Although Hartmann’s boundary-deficit concept emerged from a careful study of nightmare sufferers, Kottmeyer’s extension of this concept to abduction experiencers is based on anecdotal data (most notably the abduction accounts of Whitley Strieber) specifically selected in support of his contention. Kottmeyer is well aware that his observations are not based on any systematic study of abduction experiencers, and acknowledges that “it would obviously be child’s play to pick and choose isolated bits of confirming or discordant biographical information from the abductee literature and argue about the fit of Hartmann’s boundary-deficit profile to various individual cases” (Kottmeyer, 1988, p. 5). Accordingly, he notes a number of characteristics that the boundary-deficit hypothesis would predict. While there has not been a direct test of Kottmeyer’s theory, data relevant to a number of his predictions are available.
In their systematic comparison of control and close-encounter subjects, Spanos et al. (1993) administered a number of scales5 relevant to Kottmeyer’s predictions. Compared to the scores for control subjects, Spanos et al.’s close encounter/UFO experiencer groups showed higher Self-Esteem (Kottmeyer predicts experiencers should “be more fragile and easily hurt” and “frequently rejected”), lower Schizophrenia (Kottmeyer describes schizophrenia as a consequence of “abnormally thin” boundaries), higher Well-Being (Kottmeyer describes a disproportionate number of boundary-deficit individuals as having “contemplated or attempted suicide”), lower Perceptual Aberration (boundary-deficit individuals should be “unusually alert to lights, sounds, and sensations”), lower perception of an Unfriendly World (boundary-deficit individuals are described as “victims of life’s conflicts” who either “reject society or society rejects them”), lower Aggression (Kottmeyer predicts “a tendency to project hostility”), and no difference in Social Potency (Kottmeyer sees “emotions of powerlessness” as central to the boundary-deficit personality). Moreover, Spanos et al. found no difference between control and close-encounter subjects on Absorption, Fantasy Proneness, and three scales of Imaginal Propensity, all of which should be elevated according to the boundary-deficit hypothesis.
These findings are either inconsistent with, or clearly opposite to those that Kottmeyer’s boundary-deficit explanation would predict. However, other studies have found characteristics consistent with the predictions of a boundary-deficit personality. These include a weak sense of personal or sexual identity (Slater, 1985), schizoid tendencies (Parnell & Sprinkle, 1990), greater sensitivity to nonordinary realities (Ring & Rosing, 1990), and a high rate of reported suicide attempts (Stone-Carmen, 1994).
The equivocal nature of these findings may reflect the extreme variation across studies in assessment measures, diagnostic criteria, subject selection, data analyses, and the fact that none of these studies was designed as a direct test of the boundary-deficit hypothesis. A definitive appraisal of Kottmeyer’s theory will require such tests using consistent methodology.