(1) awakening (or an experience immediately preceding sleep); (2) hearing and/or seeing something [e.g., the Old Hag or some other apparition] come into the room and approach the bed; (3) being pressed on the chest or strangled; (4) inability to move or cry out until either being brought out of the state by someone else or breaking through the feeling of paralysis on one’s own. [Hufford, 1982, pp. 10-11]

Hufford questions whether this specificity of content across cultures can be understood simply in terms of sleep physiology. In this context, he cites an observation of Dement (a major figure in sleep research):

Our understanding of hallucinations and dreams will be complete only when we can account for specific details, that is, when we know exactly why one particular dream or hallucinatory episode is experienced in preference to all other possibilities.” [Dement et al., 1970; cited in Hufford, 1982, p. 170]

Hufford points out that “when the same proposition is applied to a particular kind of content repeated in the experiences of many independent subjects, both the need and the potential importance of such an accounting are greatly multiplied” (p. 170). Dement’s observation was in reference to dreams in general, and Hufford’s in reference to the Old Hag. But their comments are even more germane to the highly specific and consistent details of the abduction experience.

(c) Documenting a Relationship Between Sleep Anomalies and Abduction Experiences

Despite the appeals to parsimony and analogy, as yet there have been no direct tests of a linkage between sleep anomalies and abduction experiences. Rodeghier (1994) reports a somewhat greater incidence of hypnagogic imagery in a subset of abduction experiencers, but does not provide any evidence that the content of this imagery ever takes the form of an abduction experience. Gotlib (1996) provides a clinical case study suggesting a relationship between a sleep disorder and an abduction experience, but the overall prevalence of sleep disorders in the abduction-experiencer population is not known. Until such evidence is available, the sleep-anomalies explanation remains yet another interesting but undemonstrated hypothesis.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Disorders that might account for false abduction experiences or their associated symptomatology include psychosis (hallucinations and delusions), folie à deux (shared psychotic symptoms brought about by a close relationship between the percipients), conversion reactions (physiological manifestations of a psychosomatic nature; for example, marks, blotches, and discolorations of the skin), dissociative disorders (amnesia, fugue, and other conditions resulting in time loss and distortion, disorientation, and unaccounted-for wanderings), multiple personality disorder (which in addition to missing time may be characterized by messages from and/or dual identities with specific “others”), and Munchausen syndrome (self-inflicted injury or false claims of physical symptomatology).

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Psychopathology can be assessed according to a mental health practitioner’s clinical impression (based on intake interview, clinical history, or diagnosis as evolved in the course of therapy), or on the basis of standardized tests. Both approaches have been used in evaluating abduction experiencers. Regardless of the method of assessment, it should be emphasized that abnormality must be established independent of abduction phenomenology itself. For example, Schnabel (1994) describes similarities between the purported experiences of an alleged abduction victim and the symptomatology of dissociative disorders. On the basis of these similarities the reader is asked to assume that the reported abduction experiences are caused by dissociative disorders. However, because the subject is never actually diagnosed as dissociative, Schnabel’s argument is based not on a formal test for pathology, but on an appeal to parsimony.

Even when formal tests are used, their interpretation is compromised by the fact that they may fail to distinguish between dissociative tendencies and dissociative effects. For example, Powers (I 994a) assessed a group of abduction experiencers on the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) subscale of the MMPI, and on the Perceptual Alteration Scale (PAS). PTSD is correlated with dissociative tendencies. The PAS, another measure of dissociation, evaluates behavior in the domains of control, self-monitoring, concealment, consciousness, and sensory experience. Powers found a clear correlation between abduction experiences and elevated PTSD and PAS scores.

Although Powers was primarily concerned with the implications of these results for therapy, it is clear from her discussion that dissociative phenomenology was considered only as a possible cause of the abduction experience and not as a possible effect. But anyone experiencing an actual abduction by aliens might be expected to have elevated scores on the measures assessed. Indeed, in mundane cases of documented trauma (victims of rape, terrorism, witnessing an atrocity) elevated scores on the kind of measures used by Powers are both expected and obtained (Wilson, 1990).

(a) Assessments of Pathology

Clinical Impression. In some studies, diagnosis is not based on any standardized test for pathology, but on assessment interview, behavioral observation, and impression of the abduction experiencer’s subjective account. For example, Mack (1994) studied 76 abduction experiencers, and provides case studies of 13. However, noting that “a full battery of psychometric tests is time consuming and expensive” (p. 17), Mack had only four of his 76 cases formally tested for psychiatric disorder (one had already been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons; the other three tested normal).

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Other studies do employ psychological tests, but diagnosis is still largely subjective. For example, Bloecher, Clamar, and Hopkins (1985) discuss the findings of Slater (1985), a psychologist who did a blind evaluation of nine abduction experiencers. Slater found no evidence by which the reported abduction experiences could be accounted for on the basis of a mental disorder. However, the tests used to evaluate pathology were projective tests (Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test), the validity of which is particularly dependent “on the somewhat esoteric skills” (Carson & Butcher, 1992) of the individual administering them. Although there is no reason to question Slater’s skills in this regard, the fact remains that the conclusions of this study are based on the interpretation of a single individual.

Jacobson and Bruno (1994) collected extensive narrative data on the personal histories and abduction experiences of twelve individuals. Based on clinical impression, they found that none of the narratives contained elements that would suggest “the phenomenology of any currently recognized psychiatric syndrome” (p. 306). Nevertheless, hospital records showed that two of their subjects had suffered from a major psychiatric illness around the time of their abduction experience. This illustrates the danger in using clinical impression by itself as the method of assessment.

Each of these studies provides suggestive data, but each is limited in terms of methodology. Regardless of the efficacy of these approaches for the clinic, their usefulness as research data is compromised by lack of repeatability (because of the lack of standardized measurement, or the dependence of diagnostic outcome on the person doing the diagnosis), the absence of control subjects, and/or the small sample sizes studied.

Standardized tests for pathology. More extensive studies using standardized instruments have been carried out by a number of investigators. Parnell and Sprinkle (1990) tested over 200 subjects reporting UFO experiences on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), a psychometric instrument that is sensitive to psychopathology. Although the authors conclude that “no overt psychopathology was indicated” (p. 45), a closer examination of their data suggests that among those subjects who described communication with entities, some had scores on certain MMPI subscales (e.g., scale 8 — the subscale assessing schizophrenic tendency) that could be considered in the abnormal range.

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In a similar study, Rodeghier et al. (1992) used the MMPI R (revised version of the MMPI) to evaluate a group of abduction experiencers selected according to a much more strict definition of “experiencer” than that used by Parnell and Sprinkle. Again, no overt pathology was indicated for the group as a whole, but was suggestive for certain individuals in the sample.

Spanos et al. (1993) compared a group of control subjects to 49 individuals who had reported UFO-related experiences. The UFO reporters were divided into subjects who merely saw unidentified lights and those who had more elaborate close encounters. To assess psychological health, a battery of tests was administered (the schizophrenia subscale of the MMPI, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale, the Magical Ideation Scale, the Perceptual Aberration Scale, Tellegen’s Differential Personality Questionnaire). The authors found that their encounter subjects scored no lower on any measure of psychological health than the controls, and had higher psychological health scores than the controls on many of the measurements. They conclude that “these findings provide no support whatsoever for the hypothesis that UFO reporters are psychologically disturbed” (p. 628), and “the onus is on those who favor the psychopathology hypothesis to provide support for it” (p. 629).

Clinical and statistical “normality.” Despite these findings, the implication of general normality can be quite misleading. “Normal” can be understood in the clinical sense as “not pathological,” or in the statistical sense as “not significantly different from average.” From a clinical perspective, the data so far are unambiguous. Most abduction experiences cannot be accounted for in terms of known psychological disorder as measured on standardized psychometric tests.

This notwithstanding, a number of studies have shown that abduction experiencers are not representative of the general population. For example, Parnell and Sprinkle (1990) found that subjects claiming communication with aliens had a propensity for unusual feelings, thoughts, and attitudes; were suspicious, distrustful, imaginative; and had schizoid tendencies. Ring and Rosing (1990) found that their subjects reported more sensitivity to nonordinary realities as children. Rodeghier et al. (1991) found more loneliness, less happiness, and poorer sleep. Mack (1994) reports being “struck by how many abductees came from broken homes or had one or more alcoholic parents” (p. 17). Perhaps most troubling, Stone-Carrnen (1994) found that 57% of her subjects reported suicide attempts earlier in life (compared with 1.28% in the general population).

1996: THE ABDUCTION EXPERIENCE: 8

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