PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES
It has been suggested (Sagan, 1996; Vallee, 1969) that similar themes appearing in both historical folklore (e.g., encounters with fairies, elves, angels) and contemporary abduction accounts indicate a common origin in the human psyche. (For a discussion of the folkloric dimensions of the abduction experience, see Bullard, 1991.) A number of psychodynamic theories8 have been proposed to explain the manifestation of these processes as the abduction experience. Common to these theories is the notion that abduction experiences are a product of the unconscious mind. The theories differ, however, in regard to their description of these unconscious processes or in regard to the situations deemed responsible for their activation.
(a) Screen Memories for Childhood Abuse
A correlation between reported abduction experiences and reported childhood abuse experiences has been consistently found by researchers and clinicians (Laibow, 1989; Powers, 1994a, 1994b; Ring & Rosing, 1990; Rodeghier et al., 1992). An obvious (although not necessarily correct) interpretation of this correlation is that actual occurrences of childhood abuse manifest as false memories of alien abduction.
For example, Powers (1994a) suggests that the abduction experience serves as a screen memory for childhood sexual abuse because abduction by aliens “is less stressful than confronting the trauma of childhood abuse perpetrated by relatives or family friends” (p. 49), and “recasting the experience [of early childhood abuse] as a selection with such a grand purpose [i.e., for the aliens’ cosmic objectives] might restore meaning to lives threatened by traumatic memories” (Powers, 1994b, p. 46).
In support of this contention, Powers (1994a) argues that elevated PTSD and PAS scores found in both abduction experiencers and victims of childhood abuse imply that abduction experiencers are victims of childhood abuse. This she assumes because elevated scores on these scales are known to be a consequence of trauma. But why should they be regarded as any better evidence for the trauma of child abuse than the trauma of alien abduction? The answer, of course, appeals to parsimony, not evidence.
Nevertheless, a correlation between childhood abuse and the abduction experience is a persistent finding, and the implication that childhood abuse causes the abduction experience deserves careful examination. The argument’s appeal to parsimony especially deserves scrutiny.
Consider the following psychodynamic assumptions that must underlie this interpretation:
(a) Alien abduction and examination procedures are inherently less traumatic than childhood abuse, and may even be conceptualized as benign;
(b) Among all possible forms that screen memories for child abuse might take, this particular motif is a reasonable and likely candidate;
(c) As screen memories of abuse, abduction experiences “work” (i.e., they are a successful psychodynamic strategy for protecting the victim from trauma); and
(d) Total blocking of traumatic memory is an established phenomenon.
Each of these assumptions is questionable. In regard to the first assumption, it is not at all apparent that abuse by aliens is less traumatic than abuse by humans. In fact, abduction experiences are almost universally reported as traumatic (at least initially). And as Wilson (1990) has pointed out, the denial of alien abductions by society is an additional stressor for those who would accept their experiences as veridical.
In regard to the second assumption (and given that abduction experiences are indeed traumatic), what psychodynamic mechanism predicts the substitution of one traumatic event as a screen memory for another? What psychodynamic mechanism accounts for the choice of such an implausible event for the screen memory?
In regard to the third assumption, not the least of the difficulties with the screen memory interpretation is that as a screen memory, the abduction experience doesn’t work, at least not very well or very consistently. PTSD symptoms are common in the abduction experiencer population. Why are abduction experiences so specifically and consistently chosen by the unconscious to serve as screen memories when they are so ineffective in protecting the experiencer from stress?
Finally, the kind of powerful blocking of traumatic memory hypothesized to be operating in abuse cases (what Ofshe and Singer, 1994, call “robust repression”) has been seriously questioned. Although it has been argued that a “tremendous volume of data available clearly support the existence of traumatic amnesia or robust repression” (American Society of Clinical Hypnosis, 1995, p. 8), Ofshe and Singer (1994) contend that in contrast to the traditional concept of repression as described in mainstream clinical theory, the mental mechanism for forgetting major, repeated, and complex life events has developed from neither analytic tradition nor empirical research. According to their review of the literature, despite the popularity of the concept:
A citation search of the clinical literature failed to turn up any proposal that this sort of powerful mental mechanism might exist for theoretical reasons nor did it reveal reports of empirical research demonstrating the mechanism’s existence … The speculation [about the existence of robust repression] and its rapid acceptance are linked to social change rather than to scientific progress. [Ofshe & Singer, 1994, pp. 396-97]
There are other problems for the screen-memory hypothesis. If the abduction experience is a screen memory, it must be explained why this memory itself remains repressed. It could be argued that it is called into play as a defense mechanism only when the memory of actual childhood abuse — through hypnosis, therapy, or serendipity — starts to become unrepressed. But this requires yet additional untested assumptions about the psychodynamics of repression. In other cases, memories of childhood abuse coexist with abduction memories (Laibow, 1989), presenting a similar difficulty for the screen-memory hypothesis.
Given these issues, the serious investigator must consider whether the requirements of the screen-memory interpretation indeed represent a parsimonious explanation for the abduction experience. (On the other hand, the above discussion should give no comfort to those who would argue, conversely, that childhood abuse is a screen memory for actual alien abductions; the identical problems in psychodynamic theory and logical argument apply.)
Ultimately, the relationship between reported experiences of childhood abuse and alien abductions may need to be explained in terms other than those of repression and screen memory. For example, several studies (Mukerjee, 1995) have shown that individuals subjected to childhood abuse have a smaller hippocampus than that of control subjects, and that a smaller hippocampus is correlated with more pronounced symptoms of PTSD and dissociation. The hippocampus is a part of the brain that deals with short-term memory and may be involved with storage and retrieval of long-term memories. Moreover, this part of the brain is strongly affected by cortisol, a hormone linked with emotional affect and disturbing memories. It is possible, therefore, that childhood abuse alters the brain in a way that predisposes the individual to dissociation and alterations in memory production and recall. Whether or not this underlies the link between childhood abuse and abduction experiences is yet to be studied.